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where it drew this line. Id. Most im-
portantly, the Court noted that, be-
cause viability was the point at which 
a fetus could survive outside the womb, 
viability also marked the time when a 
fetus became deserving of state protec-
tion.Id. at 2818. While recognizing 
that a woman's right to terminate her 
pregnancy before viability was the cen-
tral holding of Roe, the Court pointed 
out that Roe also recognized the impor-
tance ofthe state's interest in "poten-
tiallife." Id. 
The Court then examined the tri-
mester framework established by Roe 
in light ofthe state's interest in "poten-
tiallife." Id. at 2819. The Court found 
that the trimester framework had the 
effect of contradicting some of the 
state's permissible powers in the early 
stages of a woman's pregnancy. Id. 
Because the Court believed the trimes-
ter framework undervalued the state's 
interest in "potential life," the Court 
rejected the trimester framework 
adopted in Roe. Id. 
The Court next addressed whether 
limitations on a woman's rightto abort 
pre-viability fetuses were permissible. 
Id. at 2819. The Court held that ifthe 
law was not designed to strike at the 
abortion right itself and had the inci-
dental effect of making the right more 
difficult to exercise, then such a law 
would not be invalidated. Id. Only 
where a law imposed an undue burden 
on the exercise of the right would the 
state be held to have interfered with the 
liberty interest ofthe woman protected 
by the Due Process Clause. Id. Under 
the Court's analysis, laws which "do 
no more than create a structural mecha-
nism by which the state . . . may 
express a profound respect for the life 
ofthe unborn are permitted, if they are 
not a substantial obstacle to the 
woman's exercise of the right to 
choose." Id. at 2821. 
The Court then applied the "undue 
burden" standard to the provisions of 
the Act. Id. at 2822. The Court first 
addressed the Act's definition of"medi-
cal emergency" and found that it was 
central to the operation of the other 
provisions of the Act. Id. The Court 
concluded that limiting abortions in 
certain situations to medical emergen-
cies, as defined under the Act and as 
construed by the court of appeals im-
posed no "undue burden" on a 
woman's right to an abortion. Id. at 
2822. 
The Court next addressed the in-
formed consent requirement of the Act. 
Id. The Court concluded that requiring 
specific information be given to the 
woman regarding the gestational age 
of the unborn child, the availability of 
alternatives to abortion and including a 
mandatory 24 hour waiting period, did 
not constitute an ''undue burden." Id. 
at 2823-24. The Court reasoned that 
even if the information given expressed 
a preference for childbirth over abor-
tion, the giving of truthful, non-mis-
leading information ensured that a 
woman understood the full impact of 
her decision. Id. at 2823. In so hold-
ing, the Court overruled certain por-
tions of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 
416 (1983) ("Akron f'), and Thornbird 
v. American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.747 
(1986). Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823. 
Turning to the 24 hour waiting pe-
riod, the Court overruled its decision in 
Akron I which held that a 24 hour 
waiting period served no legitimate 
state concern. Id. at 2824. The Court 
held that an informed decision would 
be promoted by some period of reflec-
tion, particularly where information 
concerning the abortion decision was 
given to the woman. Id. The Court 
acknowledged that the waiting period 
was a substantial obstacle for women 
who lacked financial resources or were 
burdened by other considerations such . 
as explaining their whereabouts to 
employers or family. Id. at 2825. 
Nevertheless, the court concluded that 
the effect of "increasing the cost and 
risk of delay of abortions" did not 
constitute an ''undue burden." Id. 
Addressing the husband notifica-
tion requirement of the Act, the Court 
concluded that based on expert testi-
mony and evidence presented to the 
lower court regarding domestic vio-
lence, the husband notification require-
ment was likely to prevent a significant 
numberofwomenfromobtainingabor-
tions. Id. at 2829. The Court con-
cluded that the father's interest in the 
potential life did not justify permitting 
a state to empower him with veto power 
over his wife's decision. Id. at 2833. 
The Court treated the parental noti-
fication requirements of the Act sum-
marily, holding that a state may require 
consent of the parent or guardian prior 
to a minor obtaining an abortion so 
long as there is an adequate judicial 
bypass. Id. at 2832. Finally, the Court 
found the record keeping requirements 
of the Act permissible. Id. The Court 
held that the requirements were rea-
sonably related to the ''preservation of 
maternal health and. . . that they 
properly respected a patient's confi-
dentiality and privacy." Id. (quoting 
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976». 
Thus, the Court upheld all of the 
provisions of the Act with the excep-
tion of the husband notification re-
quirement enunciating an ''undue bur-
den" standard by which to assess the 
constitutionality oflaws which restrict 
a woman's right to choose abortion 
prior to fetal viability. The opinion 
was joined by concurring and dissent-
ing opinions from all sides. While 
accepting its responsibility to "defme 
the freedom guaranteed by the 
Constitution's ... promise of liberty," 
the Court has charted a course which 
will continue to engender confusion 
among courts and legislatures and en-
danger the liberty of women to control 
their reproductive lives. Thus, it is 
clear that the Court's decision in Casey 
has not secured for women the consti-
tutional protection of their liberty guar-
anteed by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. . 
- Sue Lawless 
CipoUone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: 
FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABEL-
ING LAWS DO NOT PREEMPT 
CERTAIN STATE AND COMMON 
LAW ACTIONS. 
In a controversial case of flI'St im-
pression, the United States Supreme 
Court held in Cipollonev. Liggett Group, 
Inc., 112 s. Ct. 2608 (1992) that the 
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 
1969 ("1969 Act") did not preclude a 
smoker who developed lungcancerfrom 
suing cigarette manufacturers undercer-
tain state and common law theories. 
The smoker's claims for breach of ex-
press warranty, intentional ftaud and 
misrepresentation, and conspiracy were 
upheld despite the 1969 Act's warning 
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label requirements. The Court indicated, 
however, that a smoker's right to sue 
tobacco companies was not absolute. 
The Court found that the 1969 Act 
preempted claims based on fuilure to 
warn and fraudulent misrepresentation, 
thereby limiting a smoker's causes of 
action against tobacco companies. 
Rose Cipollone began smoking in 
1942. In 1983, after she developed lung 
cancer, Cipollone and her husband filed 
a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey 
asserting New Jersey law. The suit was 
against three cigarette manufucturers 
and was based on theories of strict li-
ability, negligence, express warranty, 
and intentional tort. Cipollone died 
from her illness in 1984 and her hus-
band died shortly thereafter. Their son 
maintained the action as executor of 
their estates. 
At trial, the cigarette manufacturers 
argued that the Federal Cigarette Label-
ing and Advertising Act of1965 (" 1965 
Acf'), which required a conspicuous 
label warning of the hazards of cigarette 
smoking, preempted common law 
claims against cigarette manufacturers 
for health injuries received from smok-
ing. The manufucturers also contended 
that the 1969 Act, which had spurred the 
fumous cautionary label stating ''Warn-
ing: the Surgeon General Has Deter-
mined That Cigarette Smoking Is Haz-
ardous To Your Health," protected ciga-
rette makers from all liability. After 
first allowing the claims, the district 
court ultimately ruled that the plaintiff's 
claims of breach of express warranty, 
fililureto warn, fraudulent misrepresen-
tation, and conspiracy were preempted 
by the 1965 and 1969 Acts to the extent 
that these claims relied upon the manu-
fucturers' advertising, promotional, and 
public relations activities after the effec-
tive date of the 1965 Act The Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit affinned 
the district court's ruling on this issue. 
The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to consider the pre-
emptive effect of the federal statutes. 
The Court began its analysis by 
examining the 1965 Act. Cipollone v. 
Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct 2608, 
2616 (1992). Writing for the majority, 
Justice Stevens looked to the pre-
emption provision of the 1965 Act which 
stated that "[n]o statement relating to 
smoking and health shall be required in 
the advertising of [properly labeled] 
cigarettes." Id. at 2618 (quoting Pub.L. 
89-92, 79 Stat. 282, amended by 15 
U.S.C. 1331-40, § 5(b» (emphasis in 
the original). The Court found that al-
though the preemption provision did 
prohibit state and federal rule-making 
bodies from requiring that certain warn-
ing labels be placed on cigarette labels, 
the preemption provision did not pre-
clude state law remedies. Cipollone 112 
S. Ct at 2618. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court noted that there was a 
presumption against the preemption of 
state police power regulations, includ-
ing state law damages actions. Id. The 
Court also stated that "[t]here is no 
general, inherent conflict between fed-
eral pre-emption of state warning re-
quirements and the continued validity 
of state common law damage actions." 
Id. Thus, the Court concluded that the 
Plaintiffs personal representative could 
maintain an action for damages incurred 
by the Plaintiffpriorto the enactment of 
the 1969 Act. Id. at 2619. 
After finding that the 1965 Act did 
not preempt state common law claims, 
Justice Stevens examined the 1969 Act 
Writing for a plurality offour justices, 
Stevens compared the language of the 
1969 Act with its predecessor. Id. The 
Court first noted that the amended pre-
emption provision of the 1969 Act was 
broader than the 1965 Act Id. Section 
5 of the 1969 Act provides that "[n]o 
requirement or prohibition based on 
smoking and health shall be imposed 
under State law with respect to the 
advertising or promotion of any ciga-
rettes the packages of which are [law-
fully] labeled" Id. at 2617 (quoting 
Pub.L. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87, amended by 
15 U.S.C. 1331-40, § 5(b». This lan-
guage barring requirements or prohibi-
tions imposed under state law was sub-
stantially broader than the 1965 Act's 
preemption provision whichmerelypro-
hibited health statements in smoking 
advertisements. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct 
at 2619. Because of the modified lan-
guage, the Court opined that the scope 
of the preemption provision in the 1969 
ActsubstantiaUy differed from the reach 
ofthe 1965 Act. Id. at 2619-20. 
In analyzing the significance of the 
changes between the two acts, the Court 
noted that the phrase ''requirement or 
prohibition" in the 1969 Aa suggested 
no distinction between positive enact-
ments and the common law. Id at 2620. 
The Court asserted that the plain lan-
guage of the statute encompassed obli-
gations that take the fonn of common 
law rules. Id. The Court thus rejected 
the petitioner's 8IgUIDent that the phrase 
''requirement orprohibition"limited the 
1969 Aa's preemptive scope to posi-
tive enactments by legis1aturesandagen-
cies. Id 
.The Court, however, went on to 
find that although the preemption provi-
sion was not limited to positive enact-
ments, it did not necessarily mean all 
common law claims were preempted 
Id at 2621. The Court determined that 
becausethe statute did not indicate which 
common law claims were preempted, 
each of the petitioner's claims required 
individual examination. Id The Court 
stated that the central inquiry for each of 
the petitioner's common Iawclaimsmust 
be whether the legal duty that predi-
cated the damages action constituted a 
requirement or prohibition based on 
smoking and health imposed under State 
law with respect to advertising or pro-
motion under the 1969 Act Id 
Turning to the petitioner's specific 
allegations, the Court first examined the 
petitioner's claims of a failure to warn 
due to negligence in testing and adver-
tising and lack of adequate warnings of 
the consequences of smoking. Id The 
Court found that the failure to warn 
claims relied on an assumption that the 
manufucturers should have had addi-
tional warnings in their post-1969 ad-
vertising. Id. Finding that those claims 
relied upon a state law ''requirement or 
prohibition" related to advertising or 
promotion, the Court concluded that the 
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1969 Act preempted the failure to warn 
actions to the extent they relied on a 
showing that manufacturers should have 
had additional warnings. [d. at 2621-
22. The Court, however, noted that the 
1969 Act did not preempt the petitioner's 
fuilure to warn claims that relied solely 
on the manufacturers' research or test-
ing practices or other actions unrelated 
to advertising. [d. at 2622. 
The Court next addressed the 
petitioner's claim for breach of express 
warranty. [d. Noting that an express 
warranty is not a requirement imposed 
under state law but is a voluntary under-
. taking by the manufacturer/warrantor, 
the Court stated that a claim for breach 
of warranty was not preempted by the 
1969 Act. [d. at 2622-23. 
Turning to the petitioner's allega-
tions of fraudulent misrepresentation, 
the Court first analyzed the claim that 
the manufacturers' advertising counter-
acted the effect of the federal warning 
labels. [d. at 2623. The Court stated that 
because section 5 of the 1969 Act pre-
empted state law prohibitions as well as 
requirements, the petitioner's claims 
based on state law prohibitions against 
advertising that minimized the hazards 
of smoking was preempted by the 1969 
Act. [d. In addressing the petitioner's 
second fraudulent misrepresentation 
claim based on allegations that the manu-
facturers intentionally concealed mate-
rial facts about the hazards of smoking, 
the Court noted that the petitioner's 
actions were not predicated on a duty 
under the 1969 Act but rather on a 
general duty not to deceive. [d. at 2624. 
Thus, the Court found that the 
petitioner's clams based on fraud in 
advertising were not preempted by the 
1969 Act. [d. 
Finally, the Court examined the 
petitioner's claim of conspiracy to mis-
represent [d The Court found that the 
conspimcy claim was not preempted 
because the underlying duty in such a 
claim was a duty not to conspire to 
commit fraud, rather than a duty im-
posed by the 1969 Act [d. at 2624-25. 
Justice Blackmun, after joining the 
majority in the opinion regarding the 
1965 Act, wrote separately for three 
justices and concluded that none of the 
petitioner's claims were preempted by 
the 1969 Act. [d. at 2625-26. Thus, 
Blackmun concurred only in the judg-
ment that certain claims based on fuilure 
to warn, fraudulent misrepresentation, 
express warranty and conspiracy were 
not preempted by the 1965 Act. [d. 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Tho-
mas, concluded that the 1965 Act pre-
empted petitioner's failure to warn 
claims and that the 1969 Act preempted 
allofthepetitioner'scommonlawclaims 
under the ordinary meaning of the statu-
tory language. [d. at 2632. Conse-
quently, Justice Scalia concurred only 
in the part of the judgment that held that 
the petitioner's failure to warn and 
fraudulent misrepresentation claims 
were preempted. [d. at 2637. 
In Cipollone, the Supreme Court 
held that under certain circumstances, 
cigarette manufacturers can be held li-
able for the health problems of smokers, 
notwithstanding the existence of warn-
ing labels on cigarette packages. Al-
though the ruling bars claims thatadver-
tising and labeling did not adequately 
warn smokers of the health hazards of 
smoking, it allows claims alleging mis-
representation, breach of express war-
ranty, conspiracy, and fraud as well as 
certain failure to warn claims. This 
decision may provoke thousands of new 
suits filed by smokers against tobacco 
companies. More significantly, 
Cipollone may have set a precedent to 
allow consumers to bring suit in cases 
involving any product regulated by the 
federal government, including over-the-
counter medications and alcoholic bev-
erages, in which manufacturers may 
have hidden or misrepresented possible 
side effects of their products to the 
public. 
-Ellen Ann Marth 
Burson v. Freeman: STATUTE 
PROHIBITING THE DISPLAY 
AND DISTRIBUTION OF CAM-
PAIGN MATERIALS WImIN 100 
FEET OF A POLLING PLACE 
DOES NOT VIOLATE mE FIRST 
AND FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENTS. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the 
validity of a longstanding tradition of 
regulating campaign related speech in 
the areas surrounding a polling place. 
In Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 
(1992), a plurality of the Court held 
that a Tennessee law establishing a 
100-foot campaign free zone satisfied 
a strict scrutiny analysis because it was 
necessary to serve a compelling state 
interest and was narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end. This opinion may 
prove to be more important because 
the substance of the statute, which 
regulated expressive conduct near a 
polling place, was upheld by only a 
plurality of the Court. 
Respondent, Mary Rebecca Free-
man ("Freeman"), filed suit in the Chan-
cery Court while working as treasurer 
for a political campaign in Tennessee. 
Freemanallegedthatsection2-7-111(b) 
of the Tennessee Code, which prohib-
its the solicitation of votes and the 
display or distribution of campaign 
material within 100 feet of a polling 
place, unconstitutionally restricted her 
ability to communicate with voters in 
violation of her rights under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution. The court 
dismissed her suit, finding that the law 
was not in violation of either the Ten-
nessee or the United States Constitu-
tions. The Tennessee Supreme Court 
reversed, reasoning that the State had a 
compelling interest in banning such 
activities inside the polling place but 
not in the area surrounding it. The 
court concluded that the law was not 
narrowly drawn and that it did not 
represent the least restrictive means 
available to protect the State's interest. 
The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, reversed, and up-
held the Tennessee statute because it 
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